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The East Asian countries  achieved extraordinarily fast economic growth during the 
last four decades.  Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that they represented the 
most successful case of rapid industrialisation and sustained economic growth in the 
history of mankind.  An economy like South Korea’s was unequivocally industrially 
backward in the mid-1950s. Its per capita industrial output was at the time US$ 8  
compared with US$ 7  for India and US$ 60 for Mexico.  By mid 1990, the country  
was the fifth largest car producer in the world, the largest producer of DRAM 
microchips, and the home of the world’s most efficient steel industry.  Its per capita 
income  had increased from x dollars to nearly US$ 10,000 over a thirty-five year 
time span.   
 
The Korean story of fast industrialisation and technological catch up is by no means 
unique.  The other three countries in the Gang of Four - Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore also achieved similar economic success.  More recently, these four 
countries were followed by Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia who also recorded 
sustained and rapid growth of per capita income.  Significantly, these “miracle” 
countries not only expanded at a fast rate but they also did so without any worsening 
of income distribution.  Their record of poverty reduction has been truly remarkable.  
As Professor Joseph Stiglitz, the World Bank’s Chief Economist, notes: “In 1975, six 
out of 10 Asians lived on less than $1 a day.  In Indonesia, the absolute poverty rate 
was even higher.  Today, two out of 10 East Asians are living in absolute poverty.  
Korea, Thailand and Malaysia have eliminated poverty and Indonesia is within 
striking distance of that goal.  The USA and other western countries, which have also 
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seen solid growth over the last 20 years but with little reduction in poverty rates, 
could well learn from the East Asian experience (Stiglitz, 1998).” 
 
These “miracle” economies, with an acknowledged record of economic success, have 
suddenly and simultaneously suffered an extraordinary reversal which justifies the 
term economic meltdown.  Until the eve of the crisis (which can be dated July 2, 1997 
when the Thai authorities floated the baht), the economic management of Indonesia 
(the worst hit economy) was being praised by the IMF and the World Bank.  It would 
also be true to say that no one had predicted this extraordinary turn of events for what 
had emerged as the most dynamic region of the world economy.1  Between 1980 and 
1995, the developing East Asian economies were growing at a rate nearly three times 
that of the world economy.   
 
As the crisis has developed a number of theories have been put forward to explain it.  
One of the most influential analyses ascribes the crisis to the underlying model of 
guided capitalism which most of these countries had been following in one form or 
another.  The widely respected Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Mr. Alan 
Greenspan, advanced this thesis in the following terms:  
 
[In the last decade or so, the world has observed] a consensus towards, for 
want of a better term, the Western form of free-market capitalism as the 
model which should  govern how each individual country should run its 
economy...We saw the breakdown of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the 
massive shift away from central planning  towards free market capitalist 
types of structures.  Concurrent to that was the really quite dramatic , very 
strong growth in what appeared to be a competing capitalist-type system 
in Asia.  And as a consequence of that, you had developments of types of 
structures which I believe at the end of the day were faulty, but you could 
not demonstrate that so long as growth was going at 10 percent a year.2      
                                                     
1   It could be argued that there were some worries about Thailand’s property market 
bubble and the weakness of its financial system before the crisis.  This, however, was 
not so in relation to other countries.  Even in the case of Thailand the government was 
carrying out reforms to improve the bank system.  
2  Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, 13 February 1998.  
 2
 The same thesis is more graphically put by Richard Hornik in the popular Time 
magazine as follows: 
 
…For it is the top-down nature of the Asian model itself that is the real 
cause of the crisis.  This model bred complacency, cronyism and 
corruption.  Isolated from public opinion, just as they insulated bankers 
and businessmen from market forces, the technocrats ignored the 
deafening clamour of alarm bells that market forces have been ringing for 
years…The financial crisis facing Asia today is merely a symptom of a 
much deeper problem.  The social and political assumptions on which the 
Asian model was founded are terribly outdated.  The global economy is 
far too complex and fast paced for any bureaucrats to control.  The only 
miracle in Asia is that this approach worked as long as it did. 
 
More significantly, these views are central to the IMF’s analysis of the crisis and their 
policy programme.  As conditionality for its multi-billion dollar bailout packages 
which the fund has arranged, these countries are being asked to bring about 
fundamental reforms in their economic systems.  They are asked to change, among 
many other things, their systems of corporate governance, labour laws, and 
competition laws so as to rid these economies of “crony capitalism” and “non-
transparency” and myriad market rigidities such as life-time employment in South 
Korea.   
 
The present paper critically examines this thesis.  It will first outline the main 
characteristics of the Asian model of capitalism.  It will be argued here that this thesis 
is not only incorrect, but that the policy recommendations based on it are likely to 
prolong the crisis rather than to alleviate it whilst also undermining the prospects for 
long-term growth.  The paper, therefore, recommends a fundamental change in the 
IMF’s analytical and policy approach to the crisis. 
 
 
II. The Asian Model
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 What are the main characteristics of the East Asian model?  What is the causal 
connection between them and the crisis? 
 
The Asian model is perhaps best epitomised by the experience of Japan during its 
high growth phase from 1950 to 1973.  During that period the Japanese economy 
achieved unprecedented structural transformation and economic growth.  Between 
1953 and 1973, manufacturing production expanded at a rate of 13% per annum while 
GDP expanded by nearly 10% per annum.  Although it started from a low level, 
Japan’s share of world exports of manufactures increased by a huge ten percentage 
points during this period. 
 
Economic organisation of the country during this high growth phase involved heavy 
state intervention in all spheres of the economy (the intervention was much reduced 
and the Japanese economy became much more open following its accession to OECD 
membership around 1970).  There was a close relationship between government and 
business and between them and the financial system.  Furthermore, the relationship 
between the financial system and the corporation was of a rather different kind than 
that found in the US and the UK.  
 
Professors Caves of Harvard University and Professor Uekusa of Tokyo University in 
their classic study  Industrial Organisation in Japan correctly portrayed the 
relationship between government and business in Japan as follows: 
 
Each sector of the Japanese economy has a cliental relation to a ministry 
or agency of the government.  The ministry, in addition to its various 
statutory means of dealing with the economic sector, holds a general 
implied administrative responsibility and authority that goes well beyond 
what is customary in the United States and other Western countries.  
While the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) plays the 
most prominent role, its operations are not distinctive. “The industrial 
bureaus of MITI proliferate sectoral targets and plans; they confer, they 
tinker, they exhort.  This is the economics by admonition to a degree 
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inconceivable in Washington or London.  Business makes few major 
decisions without consulting the appropriate governmental authority; the 
same is true in reverse.” (Caves and Uekusa, 1976, p.149) 
       
More specifically, following Singh (1997, 1998b, 1998c), Amsden and Singh (1994), 
Amsden (1989), and Evans (1987), some of the more important characteristics of the 
Japanese model - which were subsequently emulated to a greater or lesser degree by 
other Asian countries - can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Although there was a close relationship between government and business 
and extensive consultation through the so-called “deliberation councils”, an 
important characteristic which distinguished East Asian from other dirigiste 
states was that the government provided assistance to the corporations only 
in return for adherence to strict performance standards. 
 
2. Interventions were carried out through a system of administrative guidance 
rather than through formal legislation.  In order for this system not to be 
subject to private rent-seeking or social abuse, it required a certain autonomy 
for the permanent civil service which guided the economy. Such relative 
autonomy prevailed in East Asian states to a far greater degree than in Brazil, 
Mexico or India. 
 
3. The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in 
countries like Japan and Korea has also been very different from that of the 
US and the UK.  The former countries have followed, for example, the so-
called main bank system which involves long-term relationships between the 
corporations and the main banks.  This enables Japanese or Korean managers 
to take a long-term view in their investment decisions.  The managers are not 
constrained by the threat of hostile take-overs on stock markets as is the case 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. (Aoki and Patrick, 1992; Odagiri, 1994) 
 
4. There are differences in the internal organisation of East Asian corporations 
compared with those of the US and the UK.  The former involve a co-
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operative relationship between management and labour, epitomised by the 
system of lifetime employment in the successful large corporations.  This 
implies considerable imperfections in the labour market.  (Dore, 1986; Aoki,  
1990) 
  
5.   As for the competition in product markets, such competition is not regarded 
by the East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good.  Unlike in countries like 
the US, economic philosophy in the East Asian countries does not accept the 
dictum that “the more competition the better.”  The governments in these 
countries have taken the view that, from the perspective of promoting 
investment and technical change, the optimal degree of competition is not 
perfect or maximum competition.  The governments have therefore 
purposefully managed and guided competition: it has been encouraged but 
also restricted in a number of ways.  (Amsden and Singh, 1994)  
 
6.   Following this basic economic philosophy outlined above, the East Asian 
governments have sought not “close” but what might be called “strategic” 
integration with the world economy, i.e. they have integrated up to the point 
where it has been useful for them to do so.  Thus, during their high-growth, 
developmental phases, Japan (between 1950-1973) and Korea (1970s and 
1980s) integrated with the world economy in relation to exports but not 
imports; with respect to science and technology but not finance and 
multinational investment.  (Chakravarty and Singh, 1988) 
 
It will be appreciated that the characteristics of the Asian model outlined above are of 
an ideal type.  At one level, each country has specificities which are important.  More 
generally, the South East Asian economies such as Malaysia and Indonesia were 
much more open in terms of FDI and other capital inflows than South Korea.  The 
degree and effectiveness of state intervention also varied between  countries with 
Korea being at the top end and perhaps Thailand at the bottom end.  Nevertheless, 
there is a pronounced family resemblance in the way these countries do business and 
structure their institutions that sets them apart from the US and the UK as well as 
other developing regions. 
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III.  The Crisis and the Asian Model 
  
Table 1 indicates the contours of the financial crisis.  It shows the collapse of the 
stock markets and the currency markets in the crisis-affected countries.  From July 1, 
1997 to February 18, 1998, the stock market in the worst hit country, Indonesia, fell 
by over 80% and the exchange rate against the US$ by almost 75%.  The currency 
and stock markets had evidently interacted with each other in a negative feedback 
loop in response to external shocks. 
 
Those who attribute the crisis fundamentally to the underlying model of capitalism in 
the Asian economies have a difficulty in linking the two phenomena.  For the 
important question is, if the model was deficient, why was it so extraordinarily 
successful for so long?  What caused the sudden collapse?  To be satisfactory, a 
theory of the crisis must be able to account for both of these aspects. 
 
Krugman had argued in an influential paper (1994) that the success of the these 
economies was unlikely to be sustainable over a long period.  Using the growth 
accounting framework, he cited evidence from Alwyn Young and others to indicate 
that the Asian economic miracle was based on greater use of inputs rather than a more 
productive use of them.  Since there were obvious limits to the growth of inputs of 
labour and capital, he thought that these economies would inevitably slow down.  
This analysis, however, was by no means universally accepted.  Critics took issue 
with both the evidence and its interpretation.  They also pointed to the limitations of 
the growth accounting framework which made their conclusions highly dependent on 
a very narrow methodology.  In any case, even if Krugman’s thesis was correct, this 
cannot explain the suddenness of the Asian collapse.  The slowdown in growth 
predicted by the analysis would have occurred gradually and asymptotically, rather 
than immediately and all at once. 
 
It is also ironic, as Stiglitz points out, that the international financial institutions who 
are now ascribing the crisis to excessive government intervention were not too long 
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ago denying that there was much government intervention at all in these economies.  
When it was successful the model was being interpreted as one of a minimalist state 
in which the government only provided the overall framework for private enterprise 
to flourish.  Now that these countries have suffered a crisis, it is being conveniently 
argued that it is due to extensive state intervention (World Bank 1991; for a critique 
see Singh 1994, 1998c).    
 
More serious attempts to relate the Asian model to the crisis such as that of the IMF 
(1998) involves the notion of over-investment, disregard of profits, and the lack of 
competition in these economies.  It is suggested that close government-business 
relations led to “crony capitalism” which in turn led to excessive investment in 
unprofitable or marginal projects.  This analysis may explain a weakness of the 
system which could lead to a slowdown in economic growth, but why should it 
happen so suddenly?  Here the critics of the Asian model put forward two important 
arguments.  First, the fact that the combination of government-business-finance 
interrelationships generated a highly geared corporate sector.  High gearing made the 
corporate sector financially fragile and vulnerable to interest rate shocks. Krugman 
suggests that “crony capitalism” contributed to financial fragility through its 
pervasiveness in the critical financial sector.  The financial sector was under-
regulated, political favouritism permitted it to over-invest in areas such as property, 
and was also subject to implicit guarantees that the government would bail it out if 
serious problems developed (Krugman, 1998).   
 
The other argument is made in terms of transparency.  The markets did not have 
adequate information about the true financial status of the corporations and the banks.  
Once the markets began to assess the true facts, there was a collapse of confidence.  
As the Managing Director of the IMF, Mr. Camdessus, put it: 
 
In Korea, for example, opacity had become systemic.  The lack of 
transparency about government, corporate and financial sector operations 
concealed the extent of Korea’s problems - so much so that corrective 
action came too late and ultimately could not prevent the collapse of 
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market confidence, with the IMF finally being authorised to intervene just 
days before potential bankruptcy.3
  
To sum up, the critics of the Asian model can plausibly explain both the slowdown 
and its suddenness by invoking the lack of transparency, financial fragility, and an 




IV.  The Financial Crisis: Preliminary Analytical and Empirical Considerations 
 
The above analysis linking the financial crisis to the Asian model may be plausible, 
but is it analytically and empirically correct? 
 
The first important issue is that of the fundamentals.  Tables 2 and 3 present 
information on the relevant variables for the Asian countries directly affected by the 
crisis as well as for three countries not directly affected by the crisis - India, Mexico 
and Brazil.  Compared with the latter three countries the Asian economies all had by 
and large strong fundamentals as indicated by the following variables: 
 
• high long- and near-term rates of growth of GDP 
• low, single digit rates of inflation 
• very high domestic savings and investment rates 
• fiscal soundness with low public debt to GDP ratios 
• export orientation and high rates of growth of exports 
 
However, as Table 2 indicates, the current account deficits of the Asian countries 
tended to be somewhat larger than those of India, Mexico and Brazil.  This partly 
reflected the fact that countries like Malaysia were major recipients of FDI.  
However, in each case the deficits were sustainable and had not constrained fast 
economic growth in previous years.  Furthermore, prior to the crisis the current 
                                                     
3  Speech to Transparency International, reported in the IMF Survey, 9 February 1998. 
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accounts of the Asian countries had generally been improving.  For example, the 
Malaysian deficit had come down from 10% of GDP in 1995 to 5-6% in 1996-1997. 
 
To sum up, as Singh (1998d) notes all the affected Asian countries had strong 
“fundamentals” in the sense of a proven record of being able to sustain fast economic 
growth. In view of their export orientation, they also had the ability to service their 
debts in the medium- to long-term.  They did, however, suffer to varying degrees 
from short term imbalances such as overvalued exchange rates, as well as short term 
liabilities of the financial sector which exceeded the value of central bank reserves. 
This required some macroeconomic adjustments and restructuring of debts. In other 
words, these countries had problems of liquidity rather than solvency.  Finally, Wolf’s 
(1998) observations on the country most affected by the crisis, Indonesia, are most 
apt: 
 
Dwell for a moment, on Indonesia: its current account deficit was less 
than 4 percent of GDP throughout the 1990’s; its budget was in 
balance; inflation was below 10 percent; at the end of 1996 the real 
exchange rate (as estimated by J.P. Morgan) was just 4 percent higher 
than at the end of 1994; and the ratio to GDP of domestic bank credit 
to the private sector had risen merely from 50 percent in 1990 to 55 
percent in 1996. True, the banking system had mountains of bad debt, 
but foreign lending to Indonesian companies had largely bypassed it.  
Is anyone prepared to assert that this is a country whose exchange rate 
one might expect to depreciate by about 75 percent? Some exchange-
rate adjustment was certainly necessary; what happened beggars 
belief. (Wolf, 1998) 
  
The external capital flows to the affected countries summarised in Table 4 indicate 
the proximate cause of the financial crisis was a sudden reversal of external capital 
flows.  From 1994 to 1996 net private capital inflows to the Asian countries more 
than doubled (rising from $40.5 billion to $90.3 billion).  However, in 1997 there was 
a net outflow of $12 billion, a turnaround of over $100 billion, which is equivalent to 
about 10% of the GDP of these countries.  Although portfolio flows were fickle (a 
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positive figure of $12 billion in 1996 turned to a negative figure of $11.6 billion in 
1997), the main offenders were the commercial banks: their lending to the affected 
countries had risen from $24 billion in 1994 to $55 billion in 1996.  But in 1997 there 
was a net withdrawal of funds by the banks to the tune of $21.3 billion. 
 
The overall evidence supports the argument of Radelet and Sachs (1998) that this was 
a classic case of a panic run on the bank where each bank considered only the short-
term illiquidity of the countries concerned and consequently withdrew its funds, 
exacerbating the loss of confidence and making the crisis worse for both borrowers 
and lenders.  In more technical terms, the two authors suggest that in the financial 
markets there may be multiple equilibria and in the absence of co-ordination, the 
economic agents in this particular case ended up in a highly suboptimal equilibrium.  
Feldstein (1998) similarly notes that the IMF insistence that the crisis was caused by 
fundamental flaws intrinsic to these economies may have contributed to this bad 
equilibrium by frightening already skittish investors.  Instead of opting for multi-
billion dollar bailouts with far reaching conditionality, both these analyses suggest  
that the most useful policy for the IMF to pursue would have been to emphasise the 
sound fundamentals of these countries, their phenomenal success in export markets, 
their strong supply-side capabilities and their ability to service in the medium- to 
long- term their debt obligations.  In other words, the IMF should have acted as a co-
ordinator between borrowers and lenders to help match the maturity structure of the 




V.  Was the Asian model responsible for the crisis?  
 
We turn now to the specific issues raised with respect to the aspects of the Asian 
model which may have contributed to the crisis, starting with the suggestion that the 
reason for the market’s overreaction was the lack of transparency in the corporate and 
financial systems of the Asian countries.  This issue requires serious analysis and 
several points need to be considered.   
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First, the banks in Germany have also traditionally been less than transparent in the 
accounts they maintain with hidden reserves and often hidden provisions for losses.  
Indeed, many practitioners would regard transparency in banking as not being 
particularly virtuous.  As the new President of the European Central Bank, Wim 
Duisenberg, observed in the first speech after his appointment, what is required is 
accountability rather than transparency.   
 
Secondly, it will be appreciated that banking crises are endemic to capitalism and can 
occur with or without transparency.  For example, as recently as the early 1990s the 
Scandinavian countries, which would be very high in any international transparency 
league, had a full-blown banking crisis with serious affects on the real economy.   
 
Thirdly, on the subject of the availability of financial information, Professor 
Lamfalussy, the former chief economist of the Bank of International Settlements, has 
noted in a letter to the Financial Times:   
 
…the Bank for International Settlement is encouraged to speed up the 
publication of its statistics on international bank lending…The 
suggested improvement will surely do no harm but it will not do much 
good either as long as market participants and other concerned parties 
fail to read publicly available information or to draw practical 
conclusions from it. 
 
In the summer of 1996 the BIS reported in its half yearly statistics that 
by end-1995 the total of consolidated bank claims on South Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia reached $201.6bn….It was 
therefore known by mid-summer 1996 that bank claims maturing 
within one year made up 70 per cent of the total for South Korea, 69.4 
per cent for Thailand, 61.9 per cent for Indonesia, but “only” 47.2 per 
cent for Malaysia. 
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The BIS (1998) report therefore rightly notes that information and transparency will 
not be enough to eliminate financial crises, rather “what is also needed is the vision to 
imagine crises and the will to act pre-emptively.”   
 
Finally, it is not without interest in this connection to note that international banks had 
lent in the case of Korea huge sums of money to newly established merchant banks all 
of which did not have a long enough track record and many of which were poorly 
managed (Chang, 1998).  In normal circumstances, whether or not there is 
transparency, such lending would be regarded as imprudent or even reckless; unless, 
of course, the banks had reason to believe that they would be repaid their monies 
either by the government or through a International Monetary Fund bailout. 
 
Turning to the question of over-investment and the misallocation of resources, it is 
strange that this is being ascribed to the failings of the Asian model.  For in the 
normal workings of the Asian model, the government would have controlled the 
allocation of investment to unfavoured sectors such as real estate.  It would also have 
co-ordinated investment activity so as to maintain profits (Singh, 1998b).  It was 
precisely by abandoning the main tenets of the Asian model through financial 
liberalisation that the present imbalances were allowed to occur. 
 
Financial liberalisation was also a major factor in making the traditional corporate 
sector in Asian countries fragile.  As Table 5 shows, South Korea’s corporate sector 
was the most highly geared of the nine emerging markets in the sample (as measured 
by debt/equity ratios).  After South Korea, the Indian corporate sector is the second 
most highly geared - with a higher debt/equity ratio than either Malaysia or Thailand.  
India, however, did not have a financial crisis (for reasons which are discussed later). 
 
Before financial liberalisation in Korea, the high debt/equity ratios were not a 
significant problem.  Such high debt/equity ratios arose from the fact that the Korean 
chaebol expanded at a very fast rate with the help of loans provided by state-
controlled banks.  This enabled families with a small equity base to both own and 
control very large corporations.  These chaebol were themselves the creation of the 
government and were used as a vehicle for the government’s drive for rapid 
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industrialisation and technological catch-up.  In view of the nature of the risks 
involved in vast investments in new products and processes in a developing country,  
left to themselves the private corporations would not have been willing to undertake 
such risky activities.  But with government encouragement and its willingness to 
share the risks involved with the enterprise, and in view of the fierce competition with 
the other chaebol, they were willing to undertake such risks.  Technological risks 
were thus socialised and the resulting system produced a very fast industrialisation of 
the country that enabled Korea to capture world markets in an ever increasing range 
of more and more sophisticated products.   
 
As Lee (1992) has argued, what the government in effect was doing was operating an 
internal capital market.  Such a market, as Williamson (1975) pointed out in his 
seminal analysis of the internal allocation of capital by conglomerates, may in many 
circumstances be more efficient than an external capital market.  The latter is often 
subject to speculation, asymmetric information and myriad other market 
inefficiencies.  Stock market prices which emerge may not be efficient in Tobin’s 
fundamental valuation sense (i.e. they may be subject to speculative influences,  
whims and fashions).   
 
However, financial liberalisation fundamentally changed this whole system.  High 
debt/equity ratios without the government’s active involvement in risk taking made 
the corporate system fragile.  Furthermore, it was accentuated by the fact that not only  
was the overt government control over corporate borrowings (particularly abroad) and 
investment abandoned, but it was not even replaced by adequate prudential 
regulation. 
 
That precipitate financial liberalisation rather than the Asian model has been the main 
factor in the financial crisis of the affected countries is also indicated by the 
experience of India and China.  The Indian fundamentals, as Table 3 suggests, are 
considerably worse than those in the Asian countries struck by the crisis.  Yet India 
was able to maintain relative currency stability as well as avoid stock market panics 
despite the fact that the country in the recent period has been subject to considerable 
policy uncertainty because of unstable governments.  The main reason is that 
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although it has introduced some capital account liberalisation, it maintains extensive 
and comprehensive controls, particularly over borrowings abroad by individuals, 
corporations or banks (Singh 1998a).   
 
Similarly, China has been able to avoid financial crisis by maintaining extensive 
controls on capital movements.  This is particularly notable in view of the fact that in 
the most recent period, China has suffered reduced economic growth and considerable 
slowing down of the rate of growth of its exports.  It is also interesting that despite 
capital controls, the country, during the last decade, has been the largest recipient of 
FDI inflows in the developing world. 
 
 
VI.   Conclusion and Policy Implications. 
 
This paper has argued that the influential thesis of the US government and the IMF 
that the fundamental causes of the Asian financial crisis lie in the dirigiste model of 
guided capitalism followed by these countries is seriously mistaken.  The crisis has 
arisen in large measure by precipitate financial liberalisation which involved the 
abandonment of the essential tenets of the model. 
 
Unfortunately in the case of the IMF, the mistaken diagnosis has inevitably lead to 
wrong policy prescriptions which have exacerbated rather than alleviated the crisis.  
Apart from ascribing the crisis “fundamentally” to the Asian model, at the beginning 
of the crisis the Fund also evidently interpreted it as a traditional balance of payments 
crisis brought about by government fiscal excesses.  Its policy prescriptions therefore 
involved the usual remedies of fiscal and monetary contraction and high interest rates.  
To cope with the fundamental structural causes of the crisis (i.e. the dirigiste model), 
the Fund recommended further financial liberalisation together with far reaching 
changes in basic social institutions. 
 
The consequences of this misdiagnosis and of the policies which followed from it 
have been catastrophic. The Fund had originally estimated that as a result of its 
bailouts and conditionalities, GDP in affected countries would contract, but only by 
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relatively small amounts.  It failed fully to appreciate that the Asian crisis was not of 
the traditional type, but that it was a crisis caused by private rather than public 
profligacy, and that it was a crisis of the capital account rather than the current 
account.4  In these circumstances, the Fund’s policy of high interest rates and fiscal 
austerity have managed to effectively bankrupt the corporate and banking sectors and 
thereby generate a deep depression in the stricken economies.  Far from the small 
contraction the IMF foresaw,  Goldman Sachs now forecasts that in 1998 real GDP 
will contract by 15% in Indonesia, 8% in Thailand, and 7% in Korea. 
 
To restore economic health to Asian economies would require a radical change in the 
IMF’s analyses and policy prescriptions.  At the level of political economy, one 
important policy implication of this paper is that the deep crisis makes it all the more 
necessary for the affected countries to not only maintain the close government-
business relationships of the Asian model, but indeed to extend them to involve trade 
unions and groups in civil society.  The resolution of the crisis requires credible 
policies which must necessarily be based on co-operation and equitable sharing of the 
burden of adjustment. 
 
 
                                                     
4  Some may argue that even if the IMF had analysed the problem correctly they 
would have still applied the traditional medicine, but in that case they would at least 
have had to present a different justification.  This could have taken the form that the 
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